We study asset price bubbles in market models with proportional transaction costs λ ∈ (0, 1) and finite time horizon T in the setting of [48]. By following [27], we define the fundamental value F of a risky asset S as the price of a super-replicating portfolio for a position terminating in one unit of the asset and zero cash. We then obtain a dual representation for the fundamental value by using the super-replication theorem of [49] . We say that an asset price has a bubble if its fundamental value differs from the ask-price (1 + λ)S. We investigate the impact of transaction costs on asset price bubbles and show that our model intrinsically includes the birth of a bubble.
Introduction
In this paper we study financial asset price bubbles in market models with proportional transaction costs and finite time horizon. In the economic literature there are several contributions discussing the impact of transaction costs on the formation of asset price bubbles. It is apparent that bubbles may also appear in markets with big transaction costs, see [5] , [21] and also [22] , [43] , [53] for the speficic case of the real estate market. Several approaches can be found in the literature to explain bubbles, like asymmetric information, see [2] , [3] , heterogenous beliefs, see [26] , [52] , and noise trading such as positive feedback activity [14] , [54] , [57] , in combination with limits to arbitrage, see [1] , [13] , [55] , [56] . In [52] , the authors include transaction costs in an equilibrium model with heterogeneous beliefs and show that small transaction costs may reduce speculative trading and then prevent bubble's formation. However, price volatility and size of the bubble are not reduced effectively. For an overview of heterogeneous beliefs, we refer to [60] . Also in [58] , the authors show in an agent-based simulation that transaction costs can have positive impact by stabilizing the financial market model in the long run. From a mathematical point of view, there is a wide literature on the theory of asset bubbles in frictionless market models. In general, a bubble is given by the difference of the market price of the asset and its fundamental value. While the market price can be observed, it is less obvious how to define the fundamental value. In the martingale approach, see [11] , [30] , [36] , [44] , the fundamental value of a given asset S is given by its expectation of future cash flows with respect to an equivalent local martingale measure. This approach has been criticized in [23] for its sensitivity with respect to model's choice. Another approach defines the fundamental value of an asset by its super-replication prices, see [27] , [28] . Other approaches explain in a mathematical model the impact of microeconomic interactions on asset price formation, see [9] , [35] . In [35] , the fundamental value is exogenously given and asset price bubbles are endogenously determined by the impact of liquidity risk. In [9] , microeconomic dynamics may at an aggregate level determine a shift in the martingale measure. Further references on asset price bubbles are [6] , [7] , [8] , [29] , [33] , [34] , [51] . For a comprehensive overview see also [46] and the entry "Bubbles and Crashes" of [41] . The aim of this paper is to introduce the notion of asset price bubble in market models with proportional transaction costs. In [23] , the authors suggest a robust definition of asset price bubbles which can be interpreted as a bubble under proportional transaction costs. However, to the best of our knowledge a thorough study of this topic is still missing in the literature. In market models with proportional transaction costs λ ∈ (0, 1) we distinguish between the ask price (1 + λ)S and the bid price (1 − λ)S for a given asset price S. It is wellknown that in the frictionless case the no-arbitrage condition no free lunch with vanishing risk (NFLVR) is equivalent to the existence of an equivalent local martingale measure, see [15] . In the presence of proportional transaction costs, no-arbitrage is equivalent to the existence of consistent (local) price systems (Definition 2.1) for each λ > 0, see [25] . Roughly speaking, a consistent (local) price system can be thought as a dual market model without transaction costs where the trading happens parallel. For a detailed overview of the theory of proportional transaction costs, we refer to the books [37] and [50] . Due to the presence of transaction costs, positions in cash and in the asset are asymmetric. By following [27] , we define the fundamental value F of a given asset S as the price of a super-replicating portfolio for a position terminating in one unit of the asset and zero cash. More precisely, we are interested in super-replicating a position in the asset, and not in the liquidation value of the portfolio. First we study some properties of the fundamental value. We establish a dual representation for F for any time t ∈ [0, T ] based on the super-replication results from [10] and [49] and show time independence of the consistent (local) price system in the dual representation, see Theorem 3.9. In particular, in Theorem 3.13 we prove that the fundamental value admits a càdlàg modification. An asset price bubble is defined as the difference of the ask price with respect to the fundamental value. Introducing a concept of asset price bubble for the bid price is more complex and we refer to the discussion in Section 6. For the frictionless case, if the NFLVR condition is satisfied in the model of [27] one can apply the duality result from [42] and obtain that there is a bubble if and only if the price process S is a strict local martingale under all equivalent local martingale measures. In particular, if there is at least one equivalent local martingale measure such that S is a true martingale, there is no bubble in the market model. In our model there is no bubble in the market model if there exists a consistent price system in the non-local sense for any λ > 0, see Proposition 3.11. Further, we discuss this theoretical setting in several examples. In particular, the impact of proportional transaction costs is investigated by comparing our model to the frictionless framework of [27] . It is immediate to see that no bubble in the frictionless market model means no bubble in the analogous market model with transaction costs. On the other side, if there is a bubble in the market model with proportional transaction costs, there is also a bubble in the frictionless market model. However, if there is a bubble in the frictionless market model, the introduction of transaction costs can possibly eliminate the asset price bubble. Finally, we note that our definition of asset price bubble intrinsically includes bubbles' birth. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline the setting for market models with proportional transaction costs and extend the notion of admissible strategies. In Section 3, we introduce the definition of the fundamental value and of asset price bubbles, and establish a dual representation for the fundamental value. Further, we prove the main results, Theorem 3.9 and Theorem 3.13. In Section 4, we illustrate our results through concrete examples. In Section 5, the impact of proportional transaction costs on bubbles' formation and size is investigated. In Section 6, we briefly discuss bubbles for the bid price. In the Appendix, we state the super-replication results from [49] with small modifications.
The Setting
Let T > 0 describe a finite time horizon and let (Ω, F, (F t ) 0≤t≤T , P) be a filtered probability space where the filtration F ∶= (F t ) 0≤t≤T satisfies the usual conditions of right-continuity and saturatedness, with F 0 = {∅, Ω} and F T = F. We consider a financial market model consisting of a risk-free asset B, normalized to B ≡ 1, and a risky asset S. Throughout the paper we assume that S = (S t ) 0≤t≤T is an F-adapted stochastic process, with càdlàg and positive paths. For trading the risky asset in the market model, proportional transaction costs 0 < λ < 1 are charged, i.e., to buy one share of S at time t the trader has to pay (1 + λ)S t and for selling one share of S at time t the trader receives
This assumption is needed in the proof of Lemma 3.6 and thus also for the main result, Theorem 3.9. Definition 2.1. For λ > 0 and a stopping time 0 ≤ σ < τ ≤ T , we call CPS(σ, τ ) (resp. CPS loc (σ, τ )) the family of pairs (Q,S Q ) such that Q is a probability measure on F τ , Q ∼ P Fτ ,S Q is a martingale (resp. local martingale) under Q on ⟦σ, τ ⟧, and
A pair (Q,S Q ) in CPS(σ, τ ) (resp. CPS loc (σ, τ )) is called consistent price system (resp. consistent local price system). By Q(σ, T ) (resp. Q loc (σ, T )) we denote the set of measures Q such that there exists a pair (Q,
A consistent (local) price system can be thought as a frictionless market with better conditions for traders, see [24] . The existence of a λ-consistent (local) price system for every 0 < λ < 1 is equivalent to the condition of no arbitrage under λ transaction costs, for every 0 < λ < 1, see [25] . Considering consistent price systems in the non-local or local sense corresponds in the frictionless case to the characterization of no arbitrage using true martingales or local martingales. In both cases the difference lies in the choice of admissible trading strategies. If there is no natural numéraire it seems reasonable to compare the portfolio with positions which may be short in each asset. On the other hand, if we fix a numéraire we control the portfolio only in units of the numéraire. In particular, we do not allow short positions in the risky asset. See Chapter 5 of [25] for a more detailed discussion. For the convenience of the reader we summarize the assumptions that we use through out the survey. Assumption 1. We assume that S admits a consistent local price system for every 0 < λ ′ ≤ λ.
In the sequel we will sometimes need a stronger assumption, namely, the existence of consistent price systems (in the non-local sense) for every 0 < λ ′ ≤ λ. Assumption 2. We assume that S admits a consistent price system for every 0 < λ ′ ≤ λ. Remark 2.2. We first note for every (Q,
Furthermore, Assumption 1 guarantees that for any t ∈ [0, T ], S t ∈ L 1 (F t , Q loc ), as (2.1) implies
for any (Q,S Q ) ∈ CPS loc (0, T ).
By following [25] , [38] , for λ > 0 we denote by K λ t the solvency cone at time t, defined as
where e 1 = (1, 0), e 2 = (0, 1) are the unit vectors in R 2 , and by (−K λ t ) ○ the corresponding polar cone, given by
Definition 2.3. We define Z(σ, τ ) (resp. Z loc (σ, τ )) as the set of processes Z = (Z 1 t , Z 2 t ) σ≤t≤τ such that Z 1 is a P-martingale on ⟦σ, τ ⟧ and Z 2 is a P-martingale (resp. local Pmartingale) on ⟦σ, τ ⟧ and such that Z t ∈ (−K λ t ) ○ {0} a.s. for all t ∈ ⟦σ, τ ⟧.
The following proposition from [25] provides a convenient representation of consistent (local) price systems by elements in Z (resp. Z loc ) and follows directly from the definition of (−K λ t ) ○ in (2.3).
) is a consistent price system (resp. consistent local price system) on ⟦σ, τ ⟧.
Next, we introduce the notion of self-financing strategies and admissibility, by extending Definition 3 and 5 of [48] to a general starting value.
Definition 2.5. Let 0 < λ < 1. A self-financing trading strategy starting with initial endowment X σ is a pair of F-predictable finite variation processes (ϕ 1 t , ϕ 2 t ) σ≤t≤T on ⟦σ, T ⟧ such that
the Jordan-Hahn decomposition of ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 into the difference of two non-decreasing processes, starting at ϕ 1,↑ σ = ϕ 1,↓ σ = ϕ 2,↑ σ = ϕ 2,↓ σ = 0, these processes satisfy
The trading strategy ϕ = (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) is called admissible in a numéraire-based sense on ⟦σ,
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for all ⟦σ, T ⟧-valued stopping times τ . The trading strategy ϕ = (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) is called admissible in a numéraire-free sense on ⟦σ,
for all ⟦σ, T ⟧-valued stopping times τ . We denote by V M (X σ , σ, T, λ) (resp. V loc M (X σ , σ, T, λ)) the set of all such trading strategies in the numéraire-free sense (resp. numéraire-based sense) ϕ on the interval ⟦σ, T ⟧. We also use the notation V σ,
For more details on the differential form of (2.4) we refer the interested reader to [48] . Note that both accounts, the holdings in the bond ϕ 1 as well as the holdings in the asset ϕ 2 are separately given in the definition of a trading strategy ϕ. Having an inequality in (2.4) allows for "throwing money away", see [48] . As it is explained in [48] we could require equality in (2.4) in order to express ϕ 1 in terms of ϕ 2 . However, for our approach it is more convenient to specify both accounts separately. Remark 2.6. We now discuss the definition of admissible strategies. Since we are interested in considering strategies on a random interval with non-zero initial endowment, we need to extend Definitions 3 and 5 of [48] , as we now explain for the numéraire-based case. The argument for the numéraire-free setting is analogous. In a first step we consider the case of zero initial endowments. Assume that ϕ σ = (0, 0) and V liq τ (ϕ) ≥ −M for all ⟦σ, T ⟧-valued stopping times τ and a constant M > 0. Then ϕ corresponds to a admissible strategy ψ on [0, T ] according to Definition 3 of [48] , where (ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) ≡ (0, 0) on ⟦0, σ⟧ and ψ t = ϕ t for all t ≥ σ. Conversely, any strategy ψ on [0, T ] with (ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) ≡ (0, 0) on ⟦0, σ⟧, which is admissible in a numéraire-based sense in the sense of [48] , also satisfies Definition 2.5. Suppose now to have a non-zero initial endowment. By translation, any admissible strategy on [0, T ] with initial endowments corresponds to an admissible strategy on [0, T ] without initial endowment. This correspondence is more delicate for strategies on ⟦σ, T ⟧.
Hence, it is not enough to bound the liquidation value of a strategy by a constant in order to have a one-to-one correspondence of admissible strategies with and without endowments on ⟦σ, T ⟧. Definition 2.5 allows to obtain from any admissible strategy ψ on [0, T ] an admissible strategy ϕ ∶= ψ ⟦σ,T ⟧ on ⟦σ, T ⟧. Note that in the case of σ = 0 Definition 2.5 and Definition 3 of [48] coincide. When we consider the definition of admissibility in a numéraire-based sense on [0, T ] from an economical perspective, the role of M > 0 is to hedge the portfolio by M units of the bond, see [48] . In particular, when we superhedge a portfolio on ⟦σ, T ⟧, it seems reasonable to use the information which are available up to time σ, namely, to superhedge the portfolio by M σ units of the bond, where M σ ∈ L 1
We now comment on the integrability conditions of the lower bound M σ .
Remark 2.7. We discuss the local and the non-local case separately. In Definition 3 of [48] the liquidation value of an admissible strategy in the numéraire-based sense ϕ = (ϕ 1 t , ϕ 2 t ) t∈[0,T ] is required to be lower bounded by a constant. This guarantees that ( [48] . As explained in Remark 2.6 we wish to extend the definitions of [48] to include admissible strategies on an arbitrary interval with arbitrary initial endowment. To this propose we need to impose condition (2.5). However, we still obtain an arbitrage-free market model. In the proof of Proposition 2 of [48] the lower bound is used to apply Proposition 3.3 of [4] , respectively Theorem 1 of [59] . The conditions of these results are still fulfilled on ⟦σ, T ⟧ if (2.5) holds, and thus (
In the non-local case, Definition 5 of [48] requires that the liquidation value of an admissible strategy in the numéraire-free sense ϕ = (
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for all [0, T ]-valued stopping times τ . This guarantees that (ϕ 1 t +ϕ 2 tS Q t ) t∈[0,T ] is an optional strong Q-supermartingale for all (Q,S Q ) ∈ CPS(0, T ), see Proposition 3 of [48] . Following the proof of Proposition 3 of [48] , we apply the following conditional version of Fatou's lemma. Let (X n ) n∈N be a sequence of real-valued random variables on (Ω, F, Q) and let G ⊂ F be a sub σ-algebra. If for any ǫ > 0 there is a M > 0 such that
In our case, the family
We get that
Asset price bubbles under proportional transaction costs
The notion of an asset price bubble consists of two components, namely, the market price of an asset and its fundamental value. We assume that the market price is given by the price process S. For the fundamental value of an asset, we here follow the approach of [27] and define the fundamental value by means of the super-replication price of the asset. In frictionless market models, it is equivalent to hold the asset or to have the (market) value of the asset in the money market account. This symmetry fails in the presence of transaction costs. A trader who wants to buy a share of the asset at time t ∈ [0, T ] has to pay (1 + λ)S t . A trader who wants to liquidate her position in the asset at time t ∈ [0, T ] only receives (1−λ)S t per share of the asset. Therefore, a natural question arises. Which position should we super-replicate in order to obtain a reasonable definition of the fundamental value in the presence of transaction costs?
We say there is an asset price bubble in the market model with transaction costs if P(F σ < (1 + λ)S σ ) > 0 for some stopping time σ with values in [0, T ]. We define the asset price bubble as the process β = (β t ) 0≤t≤T given by
In Definition 4.2 of [23] , the authors provide a robust definition of an asset price bubble, which can also be interpreted as a bubble under proportional transaction costs. A difference with respect to Definition 3.1 lies in the chosen specification of trading strategies. In [23] , in the worst case scenario the strategy begins in cash, but the initial capital is all in stock, or analogously, the strategy ends in cash, but the trader has to deliver one share of the asset. Specifying both components of the trading strategies in our model allows to consider strategies starting in cash and ending in a position in the stock only.
Proof. Consider the buy and hold strategy starting at time t ∈ [0, T ]. With an initial endowment ϕ t = ((1 + λ)S t , 0) it is possible to buy one share of the asset at time t and keep it until time T . Then F t ≤ (1+λ)S t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, the bubble has almost surely non-negative paths. The fact that
We now comment on Definition 3.1, which could be interpreted as the fundamental value for the ask price. Alternatively, we could consider to super-replicate the position
which is the price one has to pay to buy the asset at time T . A trader who wants to super-replicate ((1 − λ)S T , 0) is only interested in cash, namely, in the liquidation value of the asset. However, it is not possible to re-buy at T a share of the asset at price (1 − λ)S T . On the other hand, a trader who wants to super-replicate ((1 + λ)S T , 0) is actually interested in having the asset at T in the portfolio. So, superreplicating ((1 + λ)S T , 0) might be too expensive. Therefore, we consider the position ϕ T = (0, 1) and its corresponding super-replication price as fundamental value. This corresponds to the price a trader is willing to pay if she had to hold the asset in her portfolio until the terminal time T , see [31] . As in [27] this definition allows bubble birth, see [? ] . We give an explicit example in Example 4.7.
In a frictionless market model there are well-known super-replication theorems which establish a dual representation, see e.g. [18] , [42] . Analogously there are super-replication theorems for market models with proportional transaction costs to obtain a dual representation, see e.g. [12] , [38] , [40] , [39] . We refer to the super-replication theorems of [10] and [49] . The formulations of Theorem 1.4 and Theorem 1.5 of [49] can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 3.4. Let Assumption 1 hold. We consider an F T -measurable contingent claim X T = (X 1 T , X 2 T ) which pays X 1 T many units of the bond and X 2 T many units of the risky asset at time T . Let X σ ∈ L 1 + (F σ , Q loc ) be a random variable such that
Then the following assertions are equivalent (i) There is a self-financing trading strategy ϕ on ⟦σ, T ⟧ with ϕ σ = (X σ , 0) and
It is possible to apply Proposition 2 of [48] although we consider the interval ⟦σ, T ⟧ and initial endowment ϕ σ = (X σ , 0), see Remark 2.7. Then (ϕ 1 t +ϕ 2 tS Q t ) σ≤t≤T is an optional strong supermartingale and thus 
Proof. For X T = (0, 1) and X t ∈ L 1 + (F t , Q loc ), condition (3.2) is satisfied and we get by Proposition 3.4 that
(3.7)
By Definition 3.1 and (3.7) we have that
It is left to show that
For the first direction "≤" we note that ess sup ( 
Note that in the above proof t ∈ [0, T ] can be replaced by a stopping time 0 ≤ σ ≤ T . In Proposition 3.5 the essential supremum is taken over the set CPS loc (t, T, λ) which depends on the initial time t. In contrast, if we consider the frictionless case of [27] and assume that Theorem 3.2 from [42] applies, the fundamental value S * σ of an asset S at time σ is given by
where M loc (S) denotes the set of equivalent local martingale measures for S. The essential supremum is taken over all equivalent local martingale measure of S, independently of the initial time σ. We now show that a similar independence property also holds for the fundamental value under transaction costs, see Theorem 3.9. In order to prove it, we need some preliminary results. We start with a local version of Lemma 6 and Corollary 3 of [25] . 
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and for eachλ > λ there is anλ-consistent local price system (Q,Š) ∈ CPS loc (0, T,λ) witȟ
Proof. The proof is partially based 1 on the proof of Lemma 6 of [25] . Consider the sequence of stopping time (τ n ) n∈N , where
Note that (τ n ) n∈N defines a localizing sequence for all λ-consistent local price systems as for (Q,S Q ) ∈ CPS(0, T, λ) we havẽ
for all 0 ≤ t < τ n and hence Proposition 6.1 of [49] can be applied. Further, it holds that τ n ↑ T a.s. Fixλ > λ. First we consider the interval ⟦0, σ⟧. Choose δ ≤ λ such that
By Assumption 1 there exists (Q(δ),S(δ)) ∈ CPS loc (0, σ, δ) a δ-consistent local price system on the interval ⟦0, σ⟧. We have
Hence by (3.10) we get f n ∈ L 1 (F τn∧σ , P), and for h n ∶= f n S τn∧σ we have
This implies that f n ∈ L 1 (F τn∧σ , Q(δ)) as well as f ∈ L 1 (F σ , Q(δ)) by (3.9) and the fact that
Consequently, forS n ρ ∶= E Q(δ) [f n F ρ ] and a stopping time ρ with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ (τ n ∧ σ),
We show thatS n ρ converges almost surely to a random variableS
By the Theorem of Monotone Convergence it follows that
(3.13)
For the second term we have
Since 1 {τn≥σ} ≤ 1 {τ n+1 ≥σ} for all n ∈ N, we can apply the Theorem of Monotone Convergence to concludeS n ρ a.s.
We define the processS Q(δ) = (S Q(δ) t ) 0≤t≤σ by (3.14) . Since
is a Q(δ)-martingale, it admits a unique càdlàg modification. Further,S(δ) has a unique càdlàg modification. Therefore,S Q(δ) admits a unique càdlàg modification as a local Q(δ)-martingale. By (3.12)S Q(δ) lies in the bid-ask spread forλ by construction. Thus (Q(δ),S Q(δ) ) is aλ-consistent local price system on ⟦0, σ⟧ satisfyingS
With the same construction as in the proof of Lemma 6 of [25] we can now show the existence of a consistent local price system (Q,Ŝ) ∈ CPS loc (σ, T,λ) such thatŜ σ = f . We refer to [47] for further details. We use this result to extend (Q(δ),S Q(δ) ) to a consistent local price system (Q,Š) ∈ CPS loc (0, T,λ) on the entire interval [0, T ]. We now define (Q,Š) ∈ CPS loc (0, T,λ)) which satisfiesŠ σ = f . SetQ by 
there exists a λ-consistent local price system (Q,S Q ) ∈ CPS loc (σ, T, λ) such thatS Q σ = f and Q Fσ = Q.
We can now show time independence for the essential supremum in the definition of the fundamental value. Theorem 3.9. Under Assumption 1 the following identity holds:
2) Let λ n ∶= λ + 1 n for n ∈ N. Note that there is n 0 ∈ N such that λ n 0 < 1. Fix (Q,S Q ) ∈ CPS loc (σ, T, λ) withZ 1 ,Z 2 be the associated (local) P-martingales as in Proposition 2.4. Let n ≥ n 0 . By Lemma 3.6 and Corollary 3.8 there exists (Q,SQ) ∈ CPS loc (0, T, λ n ) such thatS n σ =S Q σ . LetZ 1 ,Z 2 be the associated (local) P-martingales as in Proposition 2.4. We define a λ n -consistent local price system (Q,ŜQ) ∈ CPS loc (0, T, λ n ) bŷ
for i = 1, 2. By construction it then holds thatŜ t =S Q t for all t ≥ σ and
Since (Q,S Q ) ∈ CPS loc (σ, T, λ) and n ∈ N are arbitrary, we can conclude that for all n ∈ N F n ∶= ess sup
In particular, as the right hand side does not depend on n ∈ N we get
The limit is well defined because the sequence is monotonically decreasing and is lower dominated by (3.15), as CPS loc (σ, T, λ n ) ⊇ CPS loc (σ, T, λ n+1 ) ⊇ CPS loc (σ, T, λ). Then F ∶= lim n→∞ F n is of the form F = ess sup (Q,ŜQ)∈⋂ n∈N CPS loc (0,T,λn)
It is left to show that ⋂ n∈N CPS loc (0, T, λ n ) = CPS loc (0, T, λ). The first implication follows directly because CPS loc (0, T, λ) ⊆ CPS loc (0, T, λ n ) for all n ∈ N. Hence we get CPS loc (0, T, λ) ⊆ ⋂ n∈N CPS loc (0, T, λ n ). For the reverse implication let (Q,ŜQ) ∈ ⋂ n∈N CPS loc (0, T, λ n ).
By definition we have for each t ∈ [0, T ]
However, this can only be true if (Q,ŜQ) ∈ CPS(0, T, λ) which yields the reverse implication. Putting (3.16) and (3.17) together we obtain ess sup
Properties of the fundamental value and asset price bubbles
In this section we study some basic properties of the fundamental value and of asset price bubbles in our setting. 
19)
is unique to within evanescent processes.
Proof. Since Proposition 3.4 and Theorem 3.9 hold for all stopping times 0 ≤ σ ≤ T this follows directly from the Optional Cross-Section Theorem, see Theorem 86 in Chapter IV of [16] .
Proposition 3.11. Let Assumption 2 hold. Then we have for all stopping times 0 ≤ σ ≤ T that ess sup
In particular, there is no asset price bubble in the market model.
Proof. Let n 0 ∈ N such that 1 n 0 ≤ λ. By Assumption 2 there exists a (Q n ,S n ) ∈ CPS(0, T, 1 n ) for all n ∈ N {0}. Define µ n ∶= 1+λ 1+ 1 n for n ≥ n 0 . Then (Q n , µ nS n ) ∈ CPS(0, T, λ) for all n ≥ n 0 , since for t ∈ [0, T ] we have
Further, it holds
where we have used the martingale property of (Q n , µ nS n ) ∈ CPS(0, T, λ). For the essential supremum we get
Hence we can conclude that ess sup Proof. We first show thatF admits a càdlàg modification with respect to some Q 0 ∈ Q loc (0, T ). Since P and Q 0 are equivalent we can conclude thatF has also a càdlàg modification with respect to P. By Theorem 48 in [17] ,F admits a càdlàg modification with respect to Q 0 if and only if for every uniformly bounded increasing sequence (α n ) n∈N of stopping times lim n→∞ E Q 0 F αn exists and if lim n→∞ E Q 0 F βn = E Q 0 F limn→∞ βn for every decreasing sequence (β n ) n∈N of bounded stopping times. For convenience, we write CPS loc = CPS loc (0, T, λ) and Z loc = Z loc (0, T, λ) in the sequel. Note that we use the representation of (Q,S Q ) ∈ CPS loc from Proposition 2.4. Fix some Q 0 ∈ Q loc . As in Proposition 4.3 of [42] we first show the identity
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for all stopping times σ with values in [0, T ]. For the first direction we use monotonicity to obtain
For the reverse direction we use Theorem 3.9 to show that
Let Z = (Z 1 , Z 2 ) andZ = (Z 1 ,Z 2 ) be the processes associated to (Q,S Q ) and (Q,SQ) respectively, as in Proposition 2.4. Then we define
Obviously,Ẑ satisfies all requirements from Definition 2.3, i.e.,Ẑ ∈ Z loc . Clearly,
For the local martingale property let (τ n ) n∈N be a localizing sequence forS Q andSQ. For σ ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T we get
where we used that 1 Aσ , 1 A c σ are F σ ⊂ F s measurable. In particular, by Theorem A.33 of [20] , there exists an increasing sequence
(3.27) Thus, we obtain by the Theorem of monotone convergence
The last equality in (3.28) holds due to similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.9. This concludes the proof of (3.22) . Let now (σ n ) n∈N be a sequence of stopping times with values in [0, T ] such that σ n ↓ σ as n tends to infinity. We now prove that
If the limit exists, then lim n→∞ E Q 0 F σn < ∞ for all stopping times 0 ≤ σ ≤ T and
Analogously, we can show that E Q 0 F σ < ∞. Using (3.22) , the Fatou's lemma, and the
(3.29)
Since (3.29) holds for all (Q,S Q ) ∈ CPS loc we get that
where the last equality follows by (3.22) . It is left to show the second direction, namely,
To this propose, we first show that the family F σn ∶ n ∈ N is uniformly Q 0 -integrable. For n ∈ N we have
Here we use the property that consistent local price systems are in the bid-ask spread. Hence by uniform integrability, for all ǫ > 0 there exists δ = δ(ǫ) > 0 such that for A ∈ F T with Q 0 (A) < δ we have 
Then we have τ m ↑ T , Q 0 -a.s. as m tends to ∞. In particular, lim m→∞ Q 0 (τ m = T ) = 1. Fix ǫ > 0 and let δ ∶= δ(ǫ) > 0 be such that for all A ∈ F T with Q 0 (A) < δ then (3.32) holds.
On {τ m = T } we have that S τm t ≤ m for all 0 ≤ t < τ m and S t = S τm t , henceF σn =F σn∧τm = (1 + λ)S σn∧τm = (1 + λ)S σn for all n ∈ N, by Proposition 3.11. Since the process S is càdlàg we get lim n→∞ S σn = S σ . To conclude the proof, we apply the dominated convergence theorem by using that (F σn ) n∈N is uniformly Q 0 -integrable. Hence by (3.34) we get that lim n→∞ sup (Q,S Q )∈CPS loc
Since ǫ > 0 was arbitrary we obtain equation (3.31) . By Theorem 48 of [17] ,F has left finite limits if given a uniformly bounded increasing sequence (σ n ) n∈N of stopping times we have that lim n→∞ E Q 0 F σn exists and is finite.
The fact that the limits is finite if it exists is due to the uniform Q 0 -integrability. Fix ǫ > 0 and let δ ∶= δ(ǫ) > 0 as above. Note that lim n→∞ (1 + λ)S σn exists and is finite since S is a càdlàg process and (σ n ) n∈N is a uniformly bounded increasing sequence of stopping times. Then we have lim sup
(3.36)
Since it holds that lim inf n→∞ E Q 0 F σn ≤ lim sup n→∞ E Q 0 F σn and ǫ > 0 was arbitrary, we can conclude that the limit exists.
By Proposition 3.5, Lemma 3.10 and Theorem 3.13 we obtain that the fundamental price process is well-defined and admits a càdàg modification.
Examples
In this section we provide several examples which illustrate the general results of Section 2 and 3. In Example 4.1 we start by showing a market model under transaction cost where the asset price, driven by a fractional Brownian motion, has a bubble in the sense of Definition 3.1. Then we study how the presence of an asset price bubble in a market model without transaction costs may influence the appearance of a bubble in the analogous market model with transaction costs, and vice versa. To this purpose, we introduce the framework of [27] for frictionless market models and consider examples where the asset price is a semimartingale. In Example 4.5 we illustrate a standard market model such that there is no bubble, neither with nor without transaction cost. In Example 4.6, the market model has no bubble under transaction cost but there is a bubble without transaction cost in the sense of [27] . In Example 4.7 we illustrate how bubble's birth is already included in our model. Example 4.1. This example is based on Example 7.1 of [23] . Let W H be a fractional Brownian motion with Hurst index 0 < H < 1. We define
be the (completed) natural filtration of the process X. Note that X admits a consistent price system in the non-local sense on the interval [0, T ] for all T > 0 by Proposition 4.2 of [24] . Define the stopping time
and set
Define G t ∶= F tan t , 0 ≤ t < π 2, and G π 2 ∶= F ∞ . Consider T ≥ π 2. We now show that there exists no consistent price system in the non-local sense for any λ ∈ (0, 1). By contradiction assume that there exists a consistent price system (Q,S Q ) for S in the non-local sense for a λ ∈ (0, 1). Then we have
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , and hence also
which is not possible because S is not bounded from above for 0 < t < π 2. Thus, we can conclude that there is no consistent price system in the non-local sense. However, S satisfies Assumption 1, i.e., for every λ > 0 there exists a consistent local price system for S. Since X admits for all λ > 0 a consistent local price system (Q,S Q ) on [0, T ] for all T > 0, (Q, (S Q ) τ ) is also a consistent local price system for S on [0, T ]. We now show that there is a bubble in this market model with transaction costs for λ < 1 3. For any consistent local price system (Q,S Q ) for S we have
and because S 0 = 1
This implies for λ < 1 3S
for all consistent local price systems. Thus, we have
Therefore, we can conclude by equation (4.4) that the the asset S has a bubble under transaction cost at time t = 0.
Remark 4.2. Due to the well-known arbitrage arguments, see [15] , the process X in Example 4.1 cannot be considered to describe asset price dynamics in a market model without transaction costs. Hence in the case a comparison with an analogous frictionless market model makes no-sense. Note also that the process X can be replaced by any càdlàg process which is not bounded and admits a consistent local price system on [0, T ] for all T > 0 and for all λ > 0.
We now investigate the relation between asset price bubbles in market models with and without transaction costs. To this purpose we use [27] as reference for the frictionless market case. We now briefly recall and re-adapt the framework of [27] to be coherent with our setting outlined in Section 2. In particular, we assume that the asset price S is given by a càdlàg non-negative semimartingale such that M loc (S) ≠ ∅. Under these assumptions, NFLVR holds, see [15] . Put S ∶= (B, S). We denote by σ L(S) the set of all R 2 -valued processes ν = (ν 1 t , ν 2 t ) σ≤t≤T which are predictable on ⟦σ, T ⟧ and for which the stochastic integral process ∫ t σ ν s dS s , σ ≤ t ≤ T , is defined in the sense of 2-dimensional stochastic integration, see [45, Section III.6] . 
We say that the market model has a strong bubble if S * and S are not indistinguishable, i.e., if P(S * σ < S σ ) > 0 for some stopping 0 ≤ σ ≤ T and define the process
Note that Definition 4.4 differs from Definition 3.1 of [27] since we require v ∈ L 1 + (F t , P) in (4.5) to be consistent with Definition 3.1. In this setting the duality from Theorem 3.2 of [42] holds and we get
In the more general framework of [27] it is possible that the duality does not hold, see Remark 3.11 of [27] and the comment before for more information.
Example 4.5. Let S be a true Q 0 -martingale for some probability measure Q 0 ∼ P. Then,
is a true Q 0 -martingale and (Q 0 ,S Q 0 ) is a consistent price system in the non-local sense for S. For any stopping time 0 ≤ τ ≤ T we obtain by Proposition 3.3 that
(4.7)
Hence there is no bubble in the market model with transaction costs. Alternatively, we can observe that Assumption 2 is satisfied and thus we can apply Proposition 3.11. From Definition 4.4 we have for any stopping time 0 ≤ τ ≤ T S τ ≥ ess sup
So there is also no bubble in the market model without transaction cost in the sense of [27] .
Example 4.6. In this example we assume that S is given by a three-dimensional inverse Bessel process, i.e.,
is a three-dimensional Brownian motion with B 0 = (1, 0, 0) and consider the filtration F S defined by F S t ∶= σ(S s ∶ s ≤ t). Example 5.2 in [27] , shows that there is a bubble in the market model without transaction cost in the sense of Definition 4.4. Note that there is also a P-bubble in the sense of [46] as in the case of a complete market model these definitions coincide. However, by Theorem 5.2 of [23] we have that for all λ > 0 there exists (Q,S Q ) ∈ CPS, whereS Q is a true Q-martingale such that
(4.9)
In the notation of [23] , we say thatS Q is λ-close to S. In particular, Assumption 2 is satisfied and thus we obtain by Proposition 3.11 that there is no bubble in any market model with proportional transaction costs λ > 0. This example shows that proportional transaction costs can prevent bubbles' formation.
Example 4.7. This example is based on Example 5.4 of [27] . It illustrates that bubble birth (see [46] , [? ] ) is naturally included in our model. Let γ be a random variable with values in (0, 1], 0 < P(γ = 1) < 1 and P(γ ≥ t 0 > 0) = 1 for some t 0 ∈ (0, T ) and consider the filtration F γ generated by H t = 1 {γ≤t} , t ∈ [0, 1]. Then γ is a F γ stopping time, which represents the time when the bubble is born. Further, let W be a Brownian motion independent of γ. Denote by F W the natural filtration generated by W and define the filtration
Then γ is also an F-stopping time. Let S = (S t ) 0≤t≤1 be the unique strong solution to the SDE
for v 0 > 0. Then S is a geometric Brownian motion up to γ. At time γ the term 1 (1 − t) starts to influence the volatility which explodes until time 1. This implies that S converges to 0 as t tends to 1. We determine the fundamental value F σ of S at time σ < 1. In particular, we see that there is no bubble before time γ but the bubble starts at γ. The fundamental value F σ at time σ < 1 is given by
That is, using the initial capital (1 + λ)S σ 1 {γ>σ} we trade in such a way that we hold the asset at time 1. If at time σ, γ has already happened, we know that the volatility blows up and we can buy the asset at time 1 at price 0. However, if γ happens strictly after σ we do not know if the volatility will blow up and thus we buy the asset at time σ at price (1 + λ)S σ in order to hold the asset at time 1. As this strategy ϕ super-replicates the position (0, 1), we conclude that F σ ≤ (1 + λ)S σ 1 {γ>σ} . For the reverse direction, "≥" we use the duality from Proposition 3.4. By Example 5.4 of [27] we get ess sup
From this we obtain
Indeed, we have
This implies that F σ = (1 + λ)S σ on {σ < γ} and F σ = 0 on {σ ≥ γ}. In particular, we can conclude that γ is then the time at which the bubble is born.
Impact of transaction costs on bubble's formation
In this section we study whether transaction costs can prevent bubbles' formation and their impact on bubbles' size.
In the setting of [27] outlined in Section 4, we assume that the asset price S is a semimartingale and that M loc ≠ ∅. At time t ∈ [0, T ] we obtain by Lemma 3.12 that
In particular, we have
(5.1) From (5.1) we immediately obtain for t ∈ [0, T ] that if β NoTC t = 0, then β t = 0 and that β NoTC
which means that the quotient of the bubbles is bounded by the factor (1+λ). Furthermore, we have
It is easy to see that both bounds in (5.3) can be obtained. In Example 4.7 we get
Furthermore, we have in Example 4.6 that β t ≡ 0 and thus we obtain the equality on the right hand side of (5.3). Further, we note that 
where Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, see [19] . For T tending to infinity, then ∆ t,T (λ) tends to (1 + λ). 
Bid bubble
The lack of symmetry between buying, holding and selling a share of an asset suggests to study separately bubbles for the bid price and the ask price. In Section 3 we have introduced an asset price bubble for the ask price. If we wish to similarly define an asset price bubble for the bid price, a possible approach would be to define the fundamental value by the sub-replication price of holding one share of the asset at time T . However, in our setting it is not possible to use the common definition of sub-replication prices because our definition of trading strategies allows to throw money away, see [48] . This can be illustrated by considering the classical definition of the sub-replication price, see [32] . Denote by A(x) the the set of self-financing admissible trading strategies according to Definition 2.2 of [32] . For a derivative Z T ∈ L 0 + (F, P) we have that the sub-replication price c 0 at time 0 is given by 
As we can throw money away in our setting, the supremum in (6.1) will always be infinite. Alternatively, we can consider the claim X T = (0, −1) and define the fundamental value by the super-replication price for X T . By applying Theorem 1.5 of [49] (see Theorem A.1 in the Appendix) we obtain that in this case the fundamental price would coincide with sup (Q,S Q )∈CPS E Q −S Q T . However, the super-replication price is well-defined in this case only if Assumption 2 is in force, which implies that we only allow consistent price systems in the non-local sense and thus we get by Proposition 3.11 that sup (Q,S Q )∈CPS
If we consider the case of consistent local price systems, we need strategies which are admissible in the the numéraire-based sense. In particular, a claim X T = (X 1 T , X 2 T ) can only be super-replicated by a strategy ϕ = (ϕ 1 t , ϕ 2 t ) 0≤t≤T admissible in the numéraire-based sense, i.e. ϕ T = X T , if
for a constant M > 0. But for X T = (0, −1) equation (6.4) can only be fulfilled if S T is bounded. This is a strong restriction and in general not fulfilled. Let us consider another approach. The fundamental value in the sense of Definition 3.1 coincides with the super-replication price of holding one share of the asset at time T . For a bid-bubble we want to compare the fundamental value with the bid-price (1 − λ)S. As the bid-price is the selling price, it seems reasonable to introduce the definition of fundamental price by considering the liquidation value of one share of the asset, i.e., to super-replicate the cash position X T = ((1 − λ)S T , 0). Definition 6.1. The fundamental value for the bid-price F bid = (F bid t ) t∈[0,T ] of an asset S at time t ∈ [0, T ] in a market model with proportional transaction costs 0 < λ < 1 is defined by
T (X t , λ) with ϕ t = (X t , 0) and ϕ T = ((1 − λ)S T , 0) . 
By Proposition 3.5 we obtain that

A Super-replication Theorems
For sake of completeness we provide the super-replication theorems (Theorem 1.4, Theorem 1.5) of [49] . Note that Theorem 1.5 of [49] coincides with Theorem 4.1 of [10] . We denote by A M (X σ , σ, T, λ) (resp. A loc M (X σ , σ, T, λ) the set of all terminal values of selffinancing trading strategies ϕ, ϕ ∈ V M (X σ , σ, T, λ) (resp. ϕ ∈ V loc M (X σ , σ, T, λ)). We use the notation A σ,T (X σ , λ) = ⋃ M A M (X σ , σ, T, λ) (resp. A loc σ,T (X σ , λ) = ⋃ M A loc M (X σ , σ, T, λ)).
Theorem A.1 (Theorem 1.5, [49] ). Let Assumption 2 hold. We consider a contingent claim X T = (X 1 T , X 2 T ) which pays X 1 T many units of the bond and X 2 T many units of the risky asset at time T . The random variable X T is assumed to satisfy
for some M > 0. Then the following assertions are equivalent (i) There is a self-financing trading strategy ϕ with ϕ ≡ 0 on ⟦0, σ⟧ and ϕ T = (X 1 T , X 2 T ) which is admissible in a numéraire-free sense.
(ii) For every (Q,S Q ) ∈ CPS(σ, T ) we have
Theorem A.2 (Theorem 1.4, [49] ). Let Assumption 1 hold. We consider a contingent claim X T = (X 1 T , X 2 T ) which pays X 1 T many units of the bond and X 2 T many units of the risky asset at time T . The random variable X T is assumed to satisfy
for some M > 0. Then the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) There is a self-financing trading strategy ϕ on ⟦σ, T ⟧ with ϕ ≡ 0 on ⟦0, σ⟧ and ϕ T = (X 1 T , X 2 T ) which is admissible in a numéraire-based sense.
(ii) For every (Q,S Q ) ∈ CPS loc (σ, T ) we have
Note that in Theorem A.2 we consider the claim X T = (X 1 T , X 2 T ) instead of X T = (X 1 T , 0) as in Theorem 1.4 of [49] . However, the proof is similar. For details on the proof, we refer to [47] .
